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This chapter is based on three main books and works, namely: 
- Stakeholders and their financial responsibilities in the French water management, by 
Gabrielle Bouleau (2003, updated by Sophie Richard in 2008); 
- French Water Legislation within the context of the Framework Directive. Recent 
developments, by Gabrielle Bouleau and Sophie Richard (2008); 
- Thau basin. Case study report. Chapter 2 of the I5 project (part of the European 
IWRM.NET project), by Gabrielle Bouleau, Sylvain Barone and Sophie Richard. 
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AAPPMA: Association agréée de pêche et de protection des milieux aquatiques, fishing 
association 
ASA: Association syndicale autorisée, association of owners 
CE: Code of environment 
CLE: Commission locale de l’eau, local water commission 
CSP: Conseil Supérieur de la Pêche, national fishing council, repealed by the LEMA and 
replaced by the ONEMA 
DDASS: Direction départementale de l’action sanitaire et sociale, State service in charge of 
social sanitary issues at departmental level 
DDSV: Direction départementale des services vétérinaires, State service in charge of food 
security and animal health at departmental level 
DDT: Direction départementale du territoire, State service in charge of environmental issues 
at departmental level  
DREAL: Direction régionale de l’environnement, de l’aménagement et du logement, State 
service in charge of environment and development at regional level 
ECJ: European court of justice 
EP: European parliament 
EPTB: Etablissement public territorial de bassin, river basin territorial public body 
EU: European union 
LEMA: Loi sur l’eau et les milieux aquatiques, act on water and the aquatic environment of 
December 2006 
MISE: Mission inter-services pour l’eau, inter-service mission for water 
NGO: Non governmental organisation 
ONEMA: Office national de l’eau et des milieux aquatiques, National office for fresh waters 
PoM: Program of measures 
RBMP: River basin management plan 
SAGE: Schéma d’aménagement et de gestion des eaux, water development and management 
plan, at basin level 
SDAGE: Schéma directeur d’aménagement et de gestion des eaux, Water development and 
management master plan, at water district level 
VAT: Value added tax 
VNF: Voies navigables de France, public body in charge of managing navigable waterways 
WFD: Water framework directive 
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1. Introduction 
French water context 
France is a country of medium population density
1
 (relatively low compared to the rest of 
Europe). France is provided with an abundant supply of water and is located upstream all 
international rivers that flow across the country. Therefore France is independent for most of 
its water resources and very few inter catchment water transfers are needed. Nevertheless, the 
springs of the Rhône and the Garonne are impacted by foreign diversions in Switzerland and 
in Spain. On the Rhône, Swiss policies may hamper inflows in summer, in addition to all 
French diversions. Yet, competition and conflicts between uses exist
2
 and have resulted in 
making evolve both regulation and allocation of stakeholders’ roles in public action for water. 
Main stakes for water management 
Key issues in the water sector in France are (Bouleau, 2003): 
- Water shortages. They occur especially in the Southwest, in summer, when irrigation 
needs are high and river flows are low. Some rivers and water tables are experiencing 
severe drought because of withdrawals; 
- Pollution. The average quality of rivers and aquifers is decreasing over time. Water 
quality objectives and discharge standards are not respected everywhere. The worst 
performing industries are often the most polluting. In addition many aquifers are 
threatened by pollution by nitrates or pesticides; 
- Powerproduction. France mainly produces power through nuclear plants, some of them 
located on rivers evaporating large quantities of water. Hydropower is used to adjust this 
basis production to the demand. It often results in sudden changes of flows downstream 
dams operation.  
- Price of water. It has increased dramatically since 1991 to deal with pollution control 
investments (sewage system and treatment plant). Consumers are more sensitive to water 
prices and are more reluctant to accept further increases; 
- Flooding hazards. Flooding areas in France account for 4% of the land and cost 
approximately 150 million Euros of damage each year. During the last two decades about 
250 people died due to flooding; 
- New uses. Recreation uses (tourism, fishing, kayaking, bathing,…) and environmental 
NGOs are becoming increasingly involved in the management of rivers. 
- Territorial management and planning. How to integrate areas for flood expansion and 
mobility in spatially increasingly constrained or in high speculation areas (e.g. coastal 
areas) is becoming an important issue. 
 
The enforcement of the European Water Framework Directive (WFD) is not such an 
administrative issue in France as it is in other countries, since competent authorities (water 
agencies) already have jurisdiction over major watersheds (districts). As far as the WFD 
                                                 
1
  63, 6 million inhabitants and 98 inhabitant per km
2
 in 2007 (INSEE, available on line: 
http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg_id=98&ref_id=CMPTEF01105, accessed on July 9, 2009) 
2
  Especially during low flows periods and taking into account the ecological “use” of water (i.e. water 
for the ecosystem). 
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implementation is concerned, setting and reaching objectives of water quality (good status) 
and implementing cost recovery policy are more challenging for France and will require 
necessary changes and adjustments. 
 
Water in France is not managed according to its ownership, but its uses. After (i) an overview 
of the water governance institutional framework, (ii) the water governance arrangements will 
be tackled: the main stakeholders will be described and key issues of the current process of 
making decision will be dealt with, in the general context of implementing the WFD. The 
original institutional tools developed to integrate different water uses for the sake of 
ecosystems preservation will also be considered. 
 
Regulation will not be dealt with in this chapter
3
. However, it must be kept in mind that any 
project, development or work is still subject to specific rules. At the time of moving from 
policy to action, regulation is a necessary step to be taken into account when designing 
technical solutions. 
2. Water governance institutional framework: 
historical background and present situation 
The hegemony of the central power in France relies on the concept of “public utility” (benefit 
to the nation) that is defined by the State itself (Pezon, 1999 ; Porter, 1995 ; Cohen-Tanugi, 
1985). During the twentieth century, the French State has managed to impose this idea that it 
is responsible for the public interest in the field of water, by different means. First, by 
implementing, in 1964, a water management at catchment level that weakened local 
authorities’ power (départements and municipalities). Second, by codifying public decisions 
in quantitative or administrative routines which are only controlled by the State itself 
(especially since the 1992 Act on water). Third, this was done also by coupling up the speech 
with an important financing policy of redistribution, through the water agencies in particular 
(Bouleau, 2007).  
Nevertheless major reconstruction of public action that occur since the 1960s in the field of 
water management made evolve the role of the central regulator State as exclusive producer 
of public policies (Richard and Rieu, 2009). 
Indeed, the emergence of new levels of public action at local and sub-national levels, 
combined with the assertion of the influence of Europe has changed the scale of government 
and increased interactions between levels. The highly centralized State of the 1960s has 
evolved in stages towards a more decentralized and territorialized situation, characterized by 
the involvement of different stakeholders in the co-construction of public action. The 
increased role of private sector stakeholders also participated in a redefinition of the powers 
and scope of public action. This broadening of the political community that shapes public 
action, contributes towards making the State one of the entities producing public policy, in 
strong interaction with local governments, the private sector and associations. This evolution 
is summarized in the concept of governance (Hooghe and Marks, 2002, Rhodes, 1996). 
 
                                                 
3
  To go further, see: Bouleau G. & Richard S., 2008. Les lois sur l'eau à la lumière de la directive cadre. 
Evolution récente de la réglementation française de l'eau. Paris, Editions de l'Engref, 182p. English version to 
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Four significant elements account for understanding the current water governance framework 
in France, in the context of implementing the Water Framework Directive. First the evolution 
of the relations between the central State and local political entities, second, the lack of 
binding quality standard objectives for freshwater, third, pending prosecutions for insufficient 
enforcement of previous European directives and fourth, high expectations of the civil 
society. The following is a historical presentation of how these elements came into being. 
Relations between governmental levels and political entities 
France has a long tradition of centralization. The State gained legitimacy through military, 
colonial and economic power as it provided the French people with security and welfare. 
Scientific expertise and financial autonomy are primarily located at State level. Lords’ 
privileges and property rights were abolished during the Revolution along with all property 
requirements for voting. Private property rights were reallocated among former tenants. The 
government divided the country into 100 départements
4
 and more than 36,000 communes
5
 
(municipalities) ruled by executive boards elected through territorial representation. In 
addition, the government had State offices –with State employees - at the départemental and 
régional levels
6
 to control territorial decisions and provides financial support to their projects.  
Very recently, in 1982, the first act on decentralisation established 22 régions with distinctive 
competencies from départements. It also restricted the State control on territorial decisions to 
legal compliance but it did not suppress the tradition of cross-funding for territorial projects. 
In 2003, a second act on decentralisation went further in delegating new competencies from 
the State to local governments (départements and régions). The public bodies of the 








                                                 
4
  The départements were created in 1790. The Consulate established the Conseil général (General 
Council) and the préfet (Prefect) in 1800. The law of 10 August 1871 gave the département the status of local 
authority. The département is an administrative structure separate from the State administration, which must 
support the interests of the population of a specific territory. The General Council is competent to settle 
departmental affairs, but it has no power of decision in all areas. The 1871 law specifies its operating modalities, 
establishes the renewal of the board by half every three years and the election of the President of the General 
Council after each renewal. Councillors are elected for a term of six years by universal suffrage. The right to 
vote is granted to all adult citizens. Before 1982, the executive remained entrusted to the préfet. The Act of 1982 
(and afterwards the Act of 2003) provided the General Council with new skills while the executive is transferred 
to the President of the General Council, which prepares and implements the département's budget. 
5
  The commune is the smallest French administrative subdivision, but it is also the oldest, having 
succeeded to the towns and parishes of the Middle Ages. It was first established in 1789. The law of 5 April 
1884 is regarded as the main municipal law, establishing the general principles of organisation, supervision and 
expertise of communes. This law is still the basis of the existing communes. It considers equally the large and 
small municipalities and provides for a uniform regime for all: 
-  a municipal council elected for six years and renewed in full. The law establishes that the City Council's 
deliberations rule the affairs of the town, which opened a field of broad skills; 
-  a mayor who is the executive of the municipality that he represents and manages the budget. It prepares 
and executes the decisions of the municipal council. It is also a representative of the State vested with 
certain powers: civil, administrative policy, and enforcement of laws. 
6
  Local governments. 
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Figure 1. Territorial administrative levels in France: projects at lower level often benefit from financial 







Figure 2. State administration and territorial political entities in France. People vote through common 
suffrage for territorial political entities (municipal, departmental, and regional boards) and for national 
parliament and president. The governmental administration has territorial divisions at all levels but 
municipal where mayors are supposed to implement some governmental policies. Territorial political 
entities have different competencies and no hierarchical relations. 
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Institutional framework 
Ownership of water and water rights: originality of the French regulation of water  
A country of codified law, where water is managed according to its uses and not to its ownership 
France is a country with a system of codified law. The State was built under the Ancien 
Régime both by progressive centralisation of the law and military authority. Science and 
technology served this project of unifying the nation, which was carried out both before and 
after the Revolution, particularly with technical organisations controlling the development of 
service channels (road development or Ponts et Chaussées) and the administration of natural 
resources (mines, water and forestry). 
 
In France waterways were progressively appropriated by kings as absolute monarchy 
developed. They became public property just before the Revolution (Marc, 2006). Riparian 
rights are much more recent (1898)
7
. The right of water use has always been largely ruled by 
the State. Historically, this has been carried out by concessions in the public field and by 
authorization in the private field. But environmental law is now tending to progressively 
harmonise these two fields. The present importance of the role of the State is a matter of 
discussion. Some people consider that decentralisation is accompanied by an increasing 
power of local government and of civil society, others take the view that environmental 
legislation enables the State to increase its power over the totality of watercourses (Bouleau & 
Richard, 2008). 
The duality between public and non-public (private) domains 
The Napoleonic Civil code (1804) established the public ownership of the shipping and 
floating waterways initiated under the Ancien Régime. For private (non public) water streams, 
the Civil code only describes the limits of riparian rights and enables the appropriation of both 
spring and rain waters. But it has nothing to say in respect of the conditions of use of such 
streams. For an entire century, the “issues related to these water streams, because of the 
silence of the law, were included in the fields of case law and doctrine (…)” (Marc 2006). 
This division of France’s waterways has been maintained including when they lost their 
shipping use. Today, water courses are divided into two categories: State rivers (rivières 
domaniales) which bed and banks are public, and non-public rivers (rivières non domaniales) 
which banks belong to riparian owners. State rivers are mainly waterways, but small rivers 
can belong to the State when they used to be of national interest for shipping or log driving. 
The water of the watercourses is always a public common good
8
, even if the stream belongs 
to the public domain. The State is the owner of the bed and banks of State watercourses, but 
not of the water itself. 
                                                 
7
  For more information, see: Bouleau G. & Richard S., 2008. Les lois sur l'eau à la lumière de la 
directive cadre. Evolution récente de la réglementation française de l'eau. Paris, Editions de l'Engref, 182p. 
English version to be published in 2009. French Water Legislation within the context of the Framework 
Directive. Recent developments. 
8
  It also exists private waters that belong to the landowner. These include “closed” waters, rainfall which 
falls on his land and springs emerging from such lands. 
Richard, S., Bouleau, G. and Barone, S. (2010). Water governance in France. Institutional framework, stakeholders, arrangements and process, 
 In Jacobi P. and Sinisgali P. (Eds.), Water governance and public policies in Latin America and Europe. Sao Paulo, Anna Blume. pp 137-178
 9 
Restructuring public action in France (1964-2009): institutions before the WFD and 
their development for implementing the WFD 
In countries with codified law, the practical implementation of water management lead to 
modify the institutional framework shaped by successive legislative steps, revealing the social 
forces involved. As Pierre Lascoumes says "regulation is a music score more than a 
command, the social stakeholders are invited to play but nothing happens without them" 
(Lascoumes, 1994). Indeed, the adoption of a law constitutes a moment of publicity and of 
ritualized collective decision, which gives a particular character to the text and gives it 
legitimacy. It works like a mirror of society at a given time. In France, considering the role of 
the State, parliamentary forums are a particular place of expression of society debates, where 
social stakes often find a window of opportunity (Bouleau & Richard, 2008). 
 
Therefore, the understanding of the present water governance in France requires a detour 
through some laws that determined the structure of the institutional framework in the field of 
water during the twentieth century. 
The establishment of the Water Agencies system (1964 Act) 
The 1964 Act came into force during the “the thirty glorious years” (a period of high 
economic growth between 1945 and 1973) within a planned economy and a centralized 
political system. At that time, the State was the exclusive producer of public policy, 
particularly in the economic and environmental fields. This law turned the central 
organisation of water management in France into a more decentralised system. It introduced 
new places of public action by creating both: 
- basin committees, which are forums for negotiation, consultation, guidance and decision-
making on water at the territorial level of the catchment, 
- and the Agences financières de bassin (Water basin financial agencies at that time9), 
public institutions in charge of levying a tax on water (ecotax)
10
 to be reinvested in a 
policy to solve the water pollution problems caused by economic development (Bouleau 
and Richard, 2008; Kaczmarek, 2006).  
 
It stated the principle of management for each river basin by creating six large French river 
basins: Artois-Picardie, Rhin-Meuse, Rhône-Méditerranée and Corse, Adour-Garonne, Loire-
Bretagne and Seine-Normandie
11
. The creation of the Agences financières de bassin was the 
major innovation of this law. Based on a physical reality (the basin/watershed) and recognised 
by a regulatory power (the basin committee) the Agency blurred the administrative 
institutional boundaries by bringing together neighbouring regions and users with different 
concerns.  
 
Adopted in response to the criminalization of pollution, which was denounced by fishing 
federations, this law begun recognising the importance of environmental issues. However, the 
real environmental awareness of public policy in Europe started from the seventies, with the 
adoption of the first European directives in the field of water and the rise of the environmental 
movement. In France this movement developed mainly in the eighties. 
                                                 
9
  Current Agences de l’eau (Water agencies). 
10
  Redevance, in French. 
11
  The Act on Corsica of 22
nd
 January 2002 created the Comité de Bassin de Corse. The action area of the 
Agency is therefore now composed of two “river basin districts” each having their respective river basin 
committee: the Rhône-Méditerranée river basin committee and the river basin committee of Corsica. 
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River basin planning and concerted local water management (1992 water act) 
Despite legal provisions, binding river quality objectives provided for in the 1964 law were 
never designated before 1992 for all rivers
12
. The administration in charge of river quality 
(police de l’eau (water policing) under the authority of the Préfet would establish guiding 
documents
13
 and deliver pollution permits relying on its own expertise without assessing 
completely the cumulative effects of pollution and water diversions.  
 
Adopted in a context of decentralization and modernization of State services, the 1992 water 
law reflected a growing awareness of environmental issues, in response to serious accidents or 
major pollution (Chernobyl, Sandoz, 1986). 
 
The 1992 water law introduced a planned and concerted water management per district and 
basin. It allowed new forms of public action through local participatory mechanisms such as 
Schémas Directeurs d’Aménagement et de Gestion des Eaux (SDAGE, District Master Plan 
for Water Management) and Schémas d’Aménagement et de Gestion des Eaux (SAGE, Basin 
Plan for Water Management). The SAGE plan should be compatible with the SDAGE plan. 
These tools opened the local decision-making process to "representatives" of civil society, 
through both the basin committees -at district level- and the Local Water Commission 
(Commission Locale de l’Eau, CLE) -at local level. Besides, the 1992 Act created the 
conditions for greater control of the State. It subjected the activities and operations related to 
water and aquatic environments to a system of nomenclature defining the thresholds for 
authorisation or reporting and submitted the planning documents to signature of the Préfet 
coordinateur de bassin (Richard and Rieu, 2009). 
 
The water act of 1992 also gave new competencies to the Agences de l’eau. They became in 
charge of planning water uses, defining priorities in water allocation and setting general 
objectives for river restoration in these district master plans called Schémas Directeurs 
d’Aménagement et de Gestion des Eaux (SDAGE). Although their provisions remained vague, 
they became more and more binding.  
Towards a partial re-centralisation (2006 water act) 
The water act of 2006, called loi sur l’eau et les milieux aquatiques (Lema), renovated the 
institutional organisation of water management. In particular, it made the levies of the 
Agences de l’eau constitutional and created the Office national de l’eau et des milieux 
aquatiques (Onema, a central office of freshwaters). This creation is similar to a partial re-
centralisation as regards the monitoring and surveillance of water quality, which is a major 
issue in the context of achieving good status or good potential advocated by the WFD. 
 
The water act of 2006 establishes SDAGEs as the French equivalents for the River Basin 
Management Plans (RBMPs) under the WFD and imposes that land use plans at municipal 
(PLU) and inter-municipal (SCOT) levels should comply with them.  
 
In some areas, SDAGEs designate threatened water bodies where additional regulations 
should be negotiated locally. For this purpose a local commission is enacted (Commission 
                                                 
12
  For a complete review of main French water laws in the second half of the XX
th
 century, please refer 
to: Bouleau G. & Richard S., 2008. Les lois sur l'eau à la lumière de la directive cadre. Evolution récente de la 
réglementation française de l'eau. Paris, Editions de l'Engref, 182p. English version to be published in 2009. 
French Water Legislation within the context of the Framework Directive. Recent developments. 
13
  Circulaires, in French 
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local de l’eau, CLE) by the Préfet. Members are State representatives (at most 25%), water 
users (at least 25%) and local elected representatives (at least 50%). The CLE has the duty to 
set up a local plan of water management (Schéma d’Aménagement et de Gestion des Eaux, 
SAGE) setting local objectives and appropriate regulations to meet the objectives and solve 
the conflicts or tensions between users. This allows for a new form of local governance to 
develop. 
WFD and goal of achieving “good status” 
The role of Europe in environment policy has increased between the 70s and 2000. 
Notwithstanding the principle of subsidiarity, Member States' policies may not be in 
contradiction with the community objectives (Porta, 2006 in Bouleau, 2008). The WFD 
illustrates the specificity of the model of European integration. The WFD strengthens the 
level of the water district as the appropriate level for water management and encourages the 
active participation of all stakeholders in the implementation of the Directive. If the obligation 
of result is not new for the Member States, the fact that outputs are ecological and coupled 
with a economic binding scheme is, however, relatively new in the field of water (Bouleau, 
2008). From a governance perspective, the WFD strengthens river basin organizations (Basin 
Committee and Water Agencies), but also involves some changes in collective action, making 
them more participatory. 
The WFD
14
 was first transposed into French law by the order n°2004-338, modifying the 
environmental code (Code de l’environnement). Then further transposition was decided under 
the new water act of 2006 called loi sur l’eau et les milieux aquatiques (Lema). 
High expectation of civil society (Grenelle de l’environnement) 
In October 2008, a multi-stakeholders platform gathering governmental representatives, 
professionals and associations was set up at the national level to take decisions in the field of 
the environment and sustainable development. This process was called the “Grenelle 
environnement” referring to the social agreement of Grenelle signed in May 1968. It resulted 
in a new law which was adopted by the Parliament and currently under the review of the 
Senate.  
Driven by the high expectations of the civil society in terms of quality objectives of 
freshwaters, the projected law stipulates that 66% of all water bodies in each hydrographical 
district should achieve the good status by 2015. 
                                                 
14
  Directive 2000/60/CE of 23
rd
 October 2000. 
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3. Water governance process and arrangements 
The recent evolution of the role of the State, under the influence of both global structural 
changes and the emergence of new places of public action, allows the transition from a 
centralized form of government towards governance. This transition is particularly well 
illustrated in the field of water policy in France, as seen in the previous section. It involves 
new stakeholders, growing interactions at different territorial levels, between levels and 
stakeholders as well as increased complexity, as we shall see further. Resulting public action 
is characterized by a co-construction and sharing of expertise and resources between levels. 
Competencies of institutions relevant in water management: main stake 
holders 
In this section, the main stakeholders involved in water governance in France are presented. 
Public, private and associative stakeholders are increasingly involved in the process of 
decision-making for public action with a growing complexity and multiple interactions. 
A feature of the French stakeholders: the maîtres d’ouvrages 
The duty to decide on water-related projects (infrastructures), to initiate them and endorse the 
related responsibility is called maîtrise d’ouvrage (ownership) and authorities exerting it are 
called maîtres d’ouvrage (cf. figures 3 & 3bis). This duty is legally distributed by sectors 
among different elected boards. Command and control are mostly the duty of the State, but 
municipalities have some prerogatives in this respect for drinking and sanitation purposes. 
 
 
Figure 3. Water policy actors in France. 1/ Statuses  
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Figure 3 bis: Water policy actors in France. 2/ Functions
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State, Europe and public bodies 
Influence of Europe on water governance 
EU main institutions
16
: role of Parliament, Council and European Commission in proposing 
and approving EU directives in the field of water 
The countries that make up the European Union (EU), its member States, remain independent 
sovereign nations but they pool their sovereignty in some domains, in order to gain a strength 
and world influence none of them could have on their own. Pooling sovereignty means, in 
practice, that the member states delegate some of their decision-making powers to shared 
institutions they have created, so that decisions on specific matters of joint interest can be 
made democratically at European level. 
 
The EU's decision-making process in general and the co-decision procedure in particular 
involve three main institutions: 
- the European Parliament (EP), which represents the EU’s citizens and is directly elected 
by them; 
- the Council of the European Union, which represents the individual member states; 
- the European Commission, which seeks to uphold the interests of the Union as a whole. 
 
                                                 
15
  DIREN, DRE and DRIRE are in the process to merge. In some regions, DIREN have significant State 
funds to support flood mitigation measures.  
16
  For further information see: http://europa.eu/institutions/index_en.htm 
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This institutional triangle produces the policies and laws that apply throughout the EU. In 
principle, it is the Commission that proposes new laws, but it is the Parliament and Council 
that adopt them. The Commission and the member States then implement them, and the 
Commission ensures that the laws are properly taken on board. 
 
Two other institutions have a vital part to play: the Court of Justice upholds the rule of 
European law, and the Court of Auditors checks the financing of the Union’s activities. 
 
The powers and responsibilities of these institutions are laid down in the Treaties, which are 
the foundation of everything the EU does. They also lay down the rules and procedures that 
the EU institutions must follow. The Treaties are agreed by the presidents and/or prime 
ministers of all the EU countries, and ratified by their parliaments. 
Community directives in the field of water 
Community directives relating to water have been very sector-based up to 2000. Some 
advocated minimal standards for certain categories of water according to their use (food, 
bathing, shellfish-farming). Others protected vulnerable water (seas, atrophied areas) from a 
whole list of dangerous products or were designed at limiting their discharge. There was one, 
sometimes even several, for each type of product. 
The directive with the widest scope before the WFD (because it affected all municipalities) 
was the one on urban wastewater of 21
st
 May 1991 (modified on 27
th
 February 1998) and 
which set deadlines for collection and at least secondary treatment. 
A project of water ecological directive has been under study by the EC general direction of 
the environment, and supported by ecologists since 1988. But this project came up against the 
economic difficulties of 1980s, with representatives of Member States rejecting the text. In 
1999, the Treaty of Amsterdam came into force with a new co-decision procedure, which 
gave Parliament more power, particularly in respect of water quality. After three and half 
years of institutional negotiations on this proposition, and having narrowly avoided the failure 
of a conciliation procedure between the European Council and Parliament, the directive was 
eventually passed in spite of considerable changes from its initial version (Kallis and Butler 
2001). 
EU pending sanction: recentralization 
France is threatened by pending cases for lack of enforcement to EU water laws. The 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) declared ten cases were infringements to EU water laws and 
demanded quick compliance. The ECJ may pronounce sanctions in case of insufficient 
execution of its decisions by the French State (art. 228 of the treaty). Such sanctions have 
already been applied against France who breached EU fishing laws in the Atlantic. It cost 77 
millions Euros to the French government and was deduced from the budget of State 
administration divisions who failed to enforce the related legislation. 
 
This precedent dramatically changed the governmental attitude towards EU laws. The strategy 
now revolves around minimising the risk of prosecution. It entails recentralisation as observed 
with the creation of ONEMA.  
It also results in understating the status of waterbodies. The worry is that a site might be 
classified as better than it really is and might be downgraded when more information is 
available. Such a case could be interpreted as an infringement to the WFD which prohibits 
further degradation. By understating the status of waterbodies, France may invest 
unnecessarily in restoration measures. The opposite strategy is adopted by the UK, where 
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civil servants commonly use the term ‘no gold plating’ to prevent expensive measures from 
being undertaken on poor quality water bodies.  
State 
Environmental laws and State restructuring 
The Ministry of Environment (Ministère chargé de l’environnement) states the national policy 
in the water domain (edict 2007-995 of 31 May 2007 and edict 2000-426 of 19 May 2000).  
At governmental level, three directorates used to rule environmental issues: the directorate for 
the prevention of pollution and risks, the directorate for the protection of nature and the 
directorate of water (DE). In 2007, however, President Sarkozy decided to combine the 
ministry of equipment and the ministry of environment in one single ministry of ecology, 
energy, sustainable development and land planning. This decision resulted in a reorganisation 
of directorates. The directorate of water and biodiversity emerged as one sub-unit of the 
directorate of land and environmental planning. This ministry controls the Water agencies.  
 
State organization at regional and departmental level experienced similar restructuring: 
agricultural and urban policies are to be gathered in one departmental State office: 
Departmental Directions of land planning (DDT Directions départementales du territoire); 
industrial, land-use and environmental State offices issuing permits are already combined in 
regional State offices (DREAL Directions régionales de l’environnement, de l’aménagement 
et du logement).  
At the basin level, the river basin coordinator (préfet coordonnateur de bassin) coordinates 
the actions of the prefects of the regions and the departments (Article R213-14 CE). 
At the région and département levels, the prefects coordinate the State services responsible 
for the implementation of the regulations.  
Command and control policies 
Under the responsibility of the Préfets, at departmental level, the Mission inter-services de 
l’eau (MISE, coordinating mission between State water services) is in charge of enforcing 
water legislation and coordinating State services action in the field of water. The 
administration has two networks with which to apply the law. Administrative procedures 
(authorization decrees, formal demands) and legal procedures (fines, courts). Environmental 
polices thus have two roles: the instruction of the project to prescribe rules for the planned 
works, and the checking on the ground to ensure compliance both to these rules and to 
environmental protection as a whole. The law has provided that a fine (“procès-verbal”) 
cannot be issued in the name of several texts. When dealing with a polluting event, the 
authorised officer reporting the offence has to choose between the fishing policing, the 
policing in charge of the inspection of listed premises and the water policing. 
Public domain management 
The public domain is ruled by the ministry in charge of public works (recently joined to the 
ministry in charge of environment). Levees for flood protection are State property on the 
public domain but can be transferred to departmental assembly (Conseil général) for 
operation and maintenance. Waterways and water diversion for power generation are 
managed by private companies under state leasing. 
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Agences de l’eau and Onema 
Agences de l’eau 
The 1964 law established six agences de l’eau (basin agencies) which boundaries follow 
hydrographical logic with no consideration with former administrative limits (see figure 4). 
These agences de l’eau are under the co-responsibilities of the river basin coordinator (Préfet 
coordonnateur de bassin who is the State representative in charge of the largest region of the 
basin) and a Comité de bassin (basin committee) representing water users appointed by the 
river basin coordinator (Nicolazo 1993). They determined levies (ecotaxes) collected by Basin 
Agencies first based on oxygen demand then additional parameters. The agences de l’eau 
cannot initiate projects for they are not maîtres d’ouvrages (see figure 5). They deliver grants 
to fund projects initiated by industries and municipalities. Their financial support amounts 
typically from 20 to 50% of the total cost.  
 
 
Figure 4. 6 water agencies (Agences de l’eau) were created in 1964 according to hydrographical limits 
which do not fit with administrative levels. Many departments (presented here by their numbers) are split 
among two or three different water basins. Regions (presented here by their names) are most generally in 
one basin but region Bourgogne and Poitou-Charentes for instance are also dealing with two agencies. 
Members of the comités de bassin are appointed by the river basin coordinator to represent political local 
entities (regions, departments, municipalities), water users and State offices.  
Richard, S., Bouleau, G. and Barone, S. (2010). Water governance in France. Institutional framework, stakeholders, arrangements and process, 




Figure 5. Governance of the hydrographical level. The préfet of the largest region in the hydrographical 
district is appointed as river basin coordinator (préfet coordonnateur de bassin), and leads the dedicated 
State office named the délégation de bassin. He designates members of the Comité de bassin to represent 
water users according to State law. The comité votes levies and action plans under the control of 
Parliament and the agence de l’eau implements its decisions. The SDAGE is co-designed by the agence and 
the délégation de bassin, subject to public hearing and eventually approved by the river basin coordinator. 
Implementation of the WFD and ONEMA 
The water agency (agence de l’eau) is the executive body for decisions taken by the river 
basin committee. The river basin committee (comité de bassin) drafts the RBMPs (replacing 
SDAGEs (Article L.212-1 CE)), which require approval from the river basin coordinator 
(Article R213-4 CE). Under the responsibility of the river basin coordinator (préfét 
coordonnateur de bassin), programmes of measures (PoM) will be designed by water 
agencies and délégations de bassin, incorporating possible national measures undertaken at 
state level. PoM must consequently be approved by the river basin committee (Articles L212-
2-1, R212-19, R212-20 and R212-21 CE).  
 
Under “Lema”, the WFD implementation in French regulation was the impetus for the 
creation of a central office of freshwaters (Office National de l’Eau et des Milieux Aquatiques, 
ONEMA). It gathers 800 State employees for monitoring and command and control policies 
on field and concentrates state expertise on fresh waters (see figure 6). It is financed by a 
portion of levies collected by Water agencies. ONEMA takes the lead for setting procedures 
to implement the WFD nationwide, standardizing indicators and methods.  
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Figure 6. ONEMA was created to harmonise the WFD implementation at national level. 
Other public bodies: such as VNF 
Voies Navigables de France (VNF) is a public body responsible for managing navigable 
waterways in France. It is under the supervision of the ministry in charge of transports and 
environment. VNF charges owners, whose facilities are located on the public navigable area, 
whatever the purpose of these facilities might be, pumping or discharging water. This tax 
depends on the surface and the pumps' capacity. 
Local governments and their groupings 
Local governments (collectivités territoriales) 
Local governments (collectivités territoriales) are French political/administrative 
institutions/structures, separate from the State administration, which must support the interests 
of the population of a specific territory. Their definition and organisation is determined by the 
Constitution (Article 34 and Title XII), laws and decrees. These provisions are contained in 
the General code of Territorial authorities. A local government is defined by three criteria: 
- it has legal personality, enabling it to sue. 
- it has specific jurisdiction, which is entrusted by the Parliament17 
- it has a decision power, exercised in a council of elected representatives. The decisions are 
then implemented by the local executive powers. 
                                                 
17
  Parliament exercises legislative power (legislation and control of executive power). In France, the 
Parliament consists of two chambers: the National Assembly and the Senate. 
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The main collectivités territoriales in France are the municipalities, the départements and the 
régions. 
Municipalities and their grouping 
The commune is the oldest and the smallest political subdivision. It can be a small village 
with less than 100 inhabitants, a town or a large city like Paris. A commune has jurisdiction in 
terms of wastewater treatment. It is responsible for monitoring connections to the public 
collection network, the collection, the carrying off and disposal of wastewater, and the 
elimination of any resulting sludge. Moreover, for buildings that are not connected, the 
commune carries out a control of non-collective sewerage equipment. The Water Act of 2006 
confirms the commune’s jurisdiction in terms of drinking water supply, which was an 
optional duty before. Communes can also provide drinking water production, its transport and 
storage
18
 (articles L2224-7 and thereafter of the General Local Authorities Code). 
 
The organization of water supply, collection and treatment of wastewater and stormwater are 
under the responsibility of municipalities and their groupings. Each municipality also has the 
obligation to monitor non-collective wastewater treatment
19
 (septic tanks and land 
application). These skills are transferable to a public body for inter-municipal cooperation 
(Syndicat Intercommunal, mixed syndicate, district, and community of municipalities...). 
Once power production became nationalized after WWII, the first remaining motivation of 
cooperation has been for drinking water. To operate, the town collects four taxes that feed the 
general budget: tax on buildings, tax on non-built areas, housing tax and business tax. Water 
services and sanitation budgets are annexed budgets to the general budget of the municipality. 
They are provisioned from water billing and possible grants. The General Code of Local 
Authorities requires that both water and sanitation services are balanced. This means that the 
water bill has to cover the costs of water services and only these, and the bill for sanitation 
has to cover the costs of sanitation services. Income and expenses are balanced. 
Municipalities with fewer than 3 000 people are allowed to pay a subsidy from the general 
budget to the budget for the water and sanitation services and may have a single accounting 
system for water and sanitation. The water and sanitation bill is subject to Value Added Tax 
(VAT), which for water and sanitation services is 5.5%. 
Other collectivités territoriales: départements and régions 
The laws of decentralisation assigned compulsory jurisdiction in terms of water neither to the 
Regional governments nor to those at Departmental level. However, water is considered as a 
key issue in terms of local politics by most Départements and several Régions. With this in 
mind Departmental governments allocate a significant part of their revenue to water issues – 
on average 11,9 € per inhabitant (meeting of French Departments in 2003) – and seek from 
legislative bodies duly recognised competence and appropriate funding for it. The legitimacy 
of Departmental governments to act in the field of water is based on three factors: their 
financial and operational involvement (owner and initiator of the network, technical and 
administrative assistance to municipalities, dialogue structures), their democratic legitimacy 
                                                 
18
  «  (…) However, the competencies in terms of drinking water assumed at the date of enforcement of 
the Act N° 2006-1772 of December 30, 2006 on Water and the Aquatic Environment by Départements, 
authorized landowner boards (Association Syndicale Autorisée) or automatically created ones, cannot be carried 
out by the municipalities without the agreement of relevant public bodies” (Article L2224-7-1 of the “CGCT”). 
19
  The implementation of SPANC (non-collective sanitation public services) and their control is enhanced 
by the Act on water and the aquatic environment of 2006. 
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to act on behalf of the public interest and finally the recognized requirement to manage water 
at local level (Grandgirard 2006, in Bouleau and Richard, 2008). 
 
Thus, Departmental Governments have remained the primary financers of water services, 
after the municipalities themselves, as a complement to the financing by the Water Agencies. 
The Water Agencies are making an increasing number of contracts with Departmental 
governments to define and harmonize action and to finance this type of investment. 
Moreover, the Departmental Governments manage Accommodation Solidarity Funds (“FSL”) 
and particularly their aspects relating to water
20
, thus introducing an element of social 
cohesion. 
Some Départements have also implemented specific measures to finance the network renewal 
(Renaud et al., 2006).  
Other forms of cooperation between municipalities (and with or without other collectivités 
territoriales): specific role of EPTB 
Intercommunalité 
The term intercommunalité refers to different forms of cooperation between municipalities. 
This intercommunalité allows municipalities to join together in a public body for inter-
municipal cooperation (EPCI). Unlike the local governments, inter-municipal structures have 
only limited powers (principle of speciality). There are two types of intercommunalité: 
- the associative or flexible form (known as “without own taxation system”), financed by 
contributions from municipalities that are members. It allows them to manage together 
activities or public services; 
- the deeper or federal form (known as “with own taxation system”), characterized by the 
existence of both compulsory competencies and own taxation system. 




EPTBs come within the scope of the Water Act 1964 which had thought about a coherent 
system based on three main types of stakeholders in the field of water: 
- basin committees, 
- agences financières de bassin (present "water agencies") 
- and public institutions that can be maîtres d’ouvrages for water related operations and 
projects throughout the catchment or sub-basin. 
 
The law of 30 July 2003 on technological and natural hazards has recognised EPTBs as 
legitimate stakeholders in the management of rivers and flood prevention. The law of 23 
February 2005 on the development of rural areas has clarified the role of EPTBs in terms of 
preservation and management of wetlands. Today many references to EPTBs are included in 
the code of the environment. 
 
As seen previously, at river basin district level, Agences de l’eau have a limited duty of 
maîtrise d’ouvrage that applies only to water-related studies, but not to equipment works. At 
                                                 
20
  The Act N°2004-809 of August 13, 2004 related to local freedoms and responsibilities introduces a 
new system of solidarity with a social basis by transferring to the Accommodation Solidarity Funds (“FSL”) the 
competence to grant financial assistance (under the form of guarantee, loans, refundable advances, securities or 
subsidies) to the individuals or to the families having difficulties to pay the expenses related to their water bills. 
These come now within the competence of the Departement Governments. 
21
  For more information, see: http://www.eptb.asso.fr/ 
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sub-basin level, the Local Water Commissions (CLE) are not maîtres d’ouvrages for works 
and projects either. In order to fill this gap, the 2006 Act on water and aquatic environments 
encourages the emergence and the strengthening of institutions whose role is indeed to 
endorse this duty (maîtrise d’ouvrage) for all works. “In order facilitate, at river or river sub-
basin level, the prevention of floods and a balanced management of the water resource and 
the preservation and management of wetlands, the concerned local authority and their 
groupings can work together within a River Basin Territorial Public Body (“EPTB”)” 
(Article L213-12 of the CE). 
 
Such an association presents the following advantage: “the Water Agency can charge, at the 
request of a River Basin Territorial Public Body and its own benefit, a tax introduced by this 
body for a provided service in application of article L. 211-7. The income from this tax is fully 
paid back to the budget of the River Basin Territorial Public Body, after deduction of 
management charges” (Article L213-9-2 of the CE). 
Private stakeholders 
How is water distributed between sectors? 
In France, out of 32.6 billion m
3
 withdrawn per year, 5.75 billion m
3
 are really consumed and 





Billions of m3                     % 
Net consumption 
Billions of m3                     % 
Drinking water 5.9 18% 1.4 24% 
Irrigation 4.7 14% 2.8 49% 
Industries (without 
powerplants) 
2.9 9% 0.25 4% 
Energy production 
(powerplants) 
19.1 59% 1.3 23% 
Total 32.6 100% 5.75 100% 
Table 1. Distribution of yearly water withdrawals and consumption per sector in France (Agences de l’eau 
/ SoeS, 2008 (2006 data), Ministère chargé de l’écologie, 2007)23 
Private services 
Private water supply 
Individuals may be supplied from private springs or pump water from their own sources for 
themselves or their family. The volume of wastewater that is discharged into the public 
network is assessed on a flat rate basis and the individual is charged accordingly.  
 
Any professional (industry, farmer,…) using a private water supply must have previously 
applied for authorisation from the health authorities. Creating a protection area around it may 




                                                 
22
  19% of the withdrawals come from underground water and 81% from surface water. 
23
  Available on: http://www.eaufrance.fr/spip.php?rubrique187&id_article=449 
24
  EU drinking water directive, French water laws of 1964 and 1992. 
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The Agences de l’eau and Voies Navigables de France charge taxes and levies on water bills. 
They both may also receive taxes from individuals who are not connected to any public 
network. Actually, anyone who pumps water from river or groundwater shall pay tax to the 
water agency due to the polluter-pays principle. Anyone who diverts water from navigable 
ways shall pay taxes to Voies Navigables de France. 
Individual sanitation 
Every new building must reach satisfactory sanitation standards, whether this is through the 
public sewer system or by individual facilities. Private sanitation is not possible on all land 
since it requires permeable types of soils. 
As seen previously, the Mayor is the responsible for checking individual sanitation systems.  
 
Industries that manage their wastewater on their own pay directly to the water agency for the 
remaining effluent discharged to the river. The water agency orders a case by case assessment 
of the total amount of pollution of each industry. Upon this assessment, the tax is calculated 
according to different scales for each sort of pollutant and its precise load. 
Water and sanitation private companies managing public services 
Limits and responsibilities of the public service 
As seen previously, the public water and sanitation services are under the responsibility of the 
municipalities or their groupings.  
The water supplied by a public service must be of drinking water standard, unless specifically 
stated otherwise. A protection area must be implemented to protect every public source for 
drinking water. A by-law specifies the constraints for this area. Public drinking water must be 
regularly monitored. 
As regard sanitation, all collected wastewaters must be suitably treated, to contribute to reach 




The public networks are managed by two different stakeholders. One is the maître d’ouvrage, 
owner of the network. The other is the manager in charge of operating and maintaining the 
system. In France, most public networks belong to the commune or its grouping, which 
therefore is the maître d’ouvrage. However, in some very few cases, private companies may 
have done the investments. 
The commune may manage the service itself or it may entrust other body with the task to do 
so. The agreements differ from one case to another (see table 2). 
                                                 
25
  To go further, refer to: Bouleau 2003. Stakeholders and their financial responsibilities in the French 
water management. ENGREF Document pédagogique, Paris. 92p. 
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Type of management Duty of the operator Duty of the owner 
Direct labour operating 
(régie directe) 
 
The commune (Mayor and employees) is responsible for the service. It manages 
the network, maintains it, replaces it when needed, registers water meters and 
bills the consumers. The job can be done either by a manager or a service 
provider.  
Short public contracts  
 service provider  
 operating 
Tasks and means of the manager or the 
service provider are defined in the 
specifications bound to the contract 
The manager is paid by the maître 
d'ouvrage who maintains 
responsibility for the service. 
Delegation for public service 
(contracts for 12 years or 
more)  
 régie intéressée 
 affermage 
 concession 
The operator manages the service at his own 
risk according to contracted objectives. 
 The operator is paid by the commune 
according to results  
 
 Consumer fees go to the operator 
(délégataire) and the commune 
 Consumers or the commune pay the 
operator who provides the investment. 
The maître d'ouvrage transfers the 
responsibility of the service to the 
operator. 
 Provides the necessary 
investments and checks the 
results of the service and charges 
the consumers directly 
 Provides investment and checks 
the results of the service and 
water-pricing 
 Only checks the results of the 
service and water-pricing 
 
Table 2. Different types of agreements for water and sanitation services management (Bouleau, 2003) 
 
Direct labour operations (régie directe) and affermage are the most common. In France, 
around 50% of water services are operated directly, 50 % are delegated. Delegated services 
supply 75 % of consumers with water. Three main companies manage the delegated services, 
Veolia (ex-Compagnie Générale des Eaux), Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux and SAUR, a subsidiary 
of the Bouygues group. The turnover from delegation (part fermière) is about 5 billion euros 




Figure 7: Turnover of the delegated services in France (Bouleau, 2003) 
Turn over of the delegated services shared 
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Industries 
Industries that use water are not different from other consumers. They are either connected to 
a public network for water and/or sanitation or they have their self-private facilities. These 
cases were dealt with in the previous section. 
Those industries whose operation presents a risk to the environment (e.g. plants, big cattle 
farms, warehouses, quarries, etc..) are classified as listed premises
26
 and submitted to a 
specific regulation. 
Farmers 
Most industries deal with issues of water management by themselves, whereas farmers benefit 
from an institutional framework that promotes collective management. In France, nearly half 
of the irrigated farms benefit from collective network. And about two third of the irrigated 
farms have a private access to water resource (Gleyses and Rieu, 2000).  
There are many different types of collective management in France. Associations of private 
owners (associations syndicales) may build and operate water infrastructures (levees, 
drainage, irrigation canals). If such infrastructures are acknowledged of public utility by the 
State, all beneficial owners are bound to pay charges to cover the building and operating cost 
according to their acreage and water use (ASA, associations syndicales autorisées). ASA are mainly 
developed in the South of France. 
Regional companies for development (Sociétés d’aménagement régional, SAR) are also quite typical 
of the French panorama of collectively managing water for irrigation. They are three
27
 and were 
created in the south of France to develop the region with hydraulic infrastructures. SAR are private 
companies in which the public sector is the major shareholder. Their missions are of general interest. 
These companies run a public service, but have to balance their budget like private companies. They 
are under State supervision from their creation. However, the law of 13 August 2004 allowed the 
transfer to the regions of State property (ownership or maîtrise d’ouvrage) granted to the SAR. 
Therefore, since 2008 the State concession for two SAR has been transferred respectively to the 
regions Languedoc Roussillon (for BRL) and Provence Alpes Côte d’Azur (for SCP). 
Farmers have a strong voice in public action in France, through both trade unions and lobbies and a 
strong representation of rural communities in the parliamentary authorities. 
Power plants (nuclear, hydroelectric,…) 
After the Second World War, the French government decided to resemble all power plants in 
a unique public monopoly, Electricité de France (EDF). It was the main concessionaire of 
France powerplants. Its role has been to produce power and supply electricity to everyone. 
Some communes, which had previously directly built and operated small power plants, were 
able to keep them but had to sell the electricity to EDF. 
Where it was profitable, EDF created big dams to generate hydropower: 15% of the French 
power production comes from hydropower. And 80% of the French power production is 
generated by nuclear power plants (Bouleau, 2003). 
                                                 
26
  Installation classée pour la protection de l’environnment (ICPE), in French. 
27
  BRL (Compagnie Bas Rhône Languedoc), CACG (Compagnie d’Aménagement des Coteaux de 
Gascogne), SCP (Société du Canal de Provence) 
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The 1919 Act, which governs hydroelectric concessions
28
, planned originally, a preferential 
right for the concessionaire in place at the time of renewal of the concession. However, this 
was deemed contrary to the European law that opened up electricity generation activities to 
competition. At the European Commission’s request, French authorities abandoned the right 
of preference. It has been repealed with the adoption of the 2006 Water and from now on, any 
renewal of hydropower concession is now subject to competitive bidding through a call of 
tender. It is estimated that 34 hydropower concessions of EDF will expire between 2020 and 
2025 and will enter into a phase of renewal between 2008 and 2013, some of them 
representing major electrical issues for the country (Sénat, 2007). 
 
Regarding governance process, this change allows for extending the range of stakeholders -
including European ones- involved in hydropower generation issues. 
Recreational water-related activities and tourism 
Since 1960 the practise of sports in fresh waters (raft, canoe, rowing…) has increased a lot 
and continues to evolve. This evolution is shown by the number of licenses issued annually by 
the federations up to the 90s. Since then free practice outside federation has grown at the 
expense of clubs. 
Practitioners usually practise these sports in summer when river flows are low. Over-crowded 
areas affect riverbeds and banks stability and damage fishing habitats. Artificial flow released 
to support leisure navigation also disturbs fauna. There is no specific regulation on this issue 
but the Préfet can deny boats accessing to some points during critical periods, according to 
the assessment of any likely impact.  
Consultancy 
The increasing role of consultancy in public action construction is briefly dealt with in the 
following section on expertise. 
NGOs 
Angling (fishing) associations 
Carole Barthélémy has shown that from the 20
th
 century, anglers have reported all kinds of 
degradations of the environment (railways, river canal systems, dams and locks, sewage 
works, factories, poaching and pests) (Barthélémy 2003). 
From 1849 until 1941, fish was considered as a food associated with public well-being and 
river management consisted of promoting restocking made necessary by industrialisation. 
Then, from 1941 until 1984, the practice of fishing became institutionalised. Fishermen have 
indeed been organised in associations and federations since the 1941 Act with a central 
committee of the federations at national level. Furthermore at that time, the CSP
29
 -National 
Fishing Council- was born from a proposition of fishermen to the State to reinforce ways to 
stop poaching and to stop damaging the environment. At that time, the fishermen took 
responsibility for their role as “recognized activists for the quality of the rivers”. The CSP and 
fishing association were very bound. A clear separation of tasks between fishing associations 
and policing activities have been conducted in the 2006 water Act, with the repeal of CSP and 
                                                 
28
  That applies to the most powerful plants and the ones with greatest interest in terms of security of 
supply. 
29
  Conseil Supérieur de la Pêche, in French. The CSP has been repealed by the Lema (2006 water Act), 
and replaced by the ONEMA. 
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the creation of ONEMA. Fishing association’s competencies are from now on clearly 
reoriented towards: 
- the protection of fish species and their habitats 
- and the development of fishing activities as a leisure. 
 
Together with environmental associations, fishing associations can speak on behalf of the 
environment in the formal or informal institutions of public decision-making, such as CLE, 
comités de rivière or comités de bassin. 
Environmental NGOs 
The major role of environmental associations in the growing awareness of environmental 
issues is dealt with in the following section on expertise. 
Current process of making decision and setting environmental objectives 
Decision making structures: formal and informal concerted water management loci 
Since the 60s, the various stakeholders introduced in the previous section are increasingly 
involved in the co-construction of water public action in France. The evolution of the 
governance institutional framework allows for more space for “qualified representatives” in 
institutionalised loci for water management such as Comité de bassin, CLE or comité de 
rivière. In loci such as CLE or Comité de Bassin, percentages of formal representatives are 
defined by national law. However, the choice of local representatives that compose such 
places of public action is very dependent of local uses, tensions or conflicts. 
Therefore, even if the institutional framework is very present, local adaptability of rules is a 
reality. Informal loci are also concerned with an increase involvement of stakeholders in 
decision-making processes. 
Specificities in knowledge infrastructure at national level: expertise 
Since the 19
th
 century, the State has set itself as a master to define “public utility”, advised by 
corps of engineers who have monopoly on public expertise (Thoenig 1973; Cohen Tanugi 
1985). Three technical corps of engineers manage water. The corps of Mines is traditionally 
in charge of industrial affairs and power generation, the corps of Ponts et Chaussées 
traditionally focuses on land-use and large public infrastructures (waterways, highways, 
cities, …), the corps of Génie Rural, Eaux et Forêts rules agricultural issues and rural affairs. 
Unchallenged by civil society, strongly subjected to internal peer-review processes, each 
corps developed its one-best-way to manage water notably within specific public research 
institutes. Today, the implementation of the WFD largely relies on state experts coming from 
public research institutes (IFREMER, BRGM, Cemagref, …), délégations de bassin and 
agences de l’eau.  
 
Until recently regional, departmental and municipal boards had little technical staff and 
heavily relied on state or private expertise but things are changing as the State reduces its 
staff. This illustrates the weakening of State power. The expertise is still at State level but as 
we have seen in previous section many decisions are to be taken by local elected boards.  
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As a consequence of the evolution of governance, the increasing role of consultancy (private 
expertise) in public action leads to a fragmentation of knowledge and threatens the 
monopolistic expertise of the State. 
 
Environmental associations are important stakeholders, which have been very efficient in 
raising public awareness on pollution and ecological crises since the 70s. However their status 
is weak which hampers their power. The law of 1901 on associations states that members of 
the executive board of the associations cannot be employed by the association. Only 
volunteers can lead associations in France, which considerably restricts their power. Such 
environmental NGOs are unevenly located in France. They have a greater power to influence 
politics in the North than in the South.  
 
Therefore public participation is seen as a necessary challenge by both NGOs and experts. 
Funding and cross funding 
The agences de l’eau raise a total budget of 1,700 Million Euros per year which is entirely 
dedicated to water management and should cover the cost of the WFD implementation. This 
budget is allocated to projects according to a 5-year programme approved by the Comité de 
Bassin and the State parliament. This programme is bound to become the Programme of 
Measures (PoM).  
 
Local maîtres d’ouvrage (communes, syndicats, EPTB, départements and régions) raise funds 
from water-related fees. The law of 1992 stipulates that “only water pays for water” which 
means that water users should cover 100% of the cost of municipal services including the 
ecotax charged by the water agency for environmental costs. This ecotax (redevance) is then 
used for water protection as an incentive.  
 
Nevertheless initial cost of water infrastructure often benefit from subsidies coming from 
upper levels. Local maîtres d’ouvrage often rely partially (up to 80%) on financial support 
from governance levels located above. Such a separation of powers poses a challenge to the 
State that is legally responsible for the implementation of the WFD but has to rely on other 
maîtres d’ouvrage to implement measures consisting of infrastructures.  
 
The major part of water infrastructures in France have been built in the last century, 
benefiting from public funding and cross-subsidies. At present, new large investments are less 
and less frequent and the major issue is maintenance and renewal of existing infrastructures. 
Current process of setting environmental objectives and implementing WFD 
Legal framework: command and control policies 
The administrative supervision of the watercourses is under the responsibility of the Préfets in 
each department and the mayors (Article L215-7 of the Environment Code). The enforcement 
of the law relies on State administration at the departmental level (6 to 10 agents per 
department) and on NGOs. Environmental associations perform as a suppletive administration 
for the environment as they voice out most habitat degradations and get subsidies from the 
Ministry of the Environment (Lascoumes 1994). Mayors issue construction permits, and they 
control pollution at the local level. 
Command and control are mostly the duty of the State, but municipalities have some 
prerogatives in this respect for drinking and sanitation purposes.  
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Organisational framework for implementing the WFD 
French organisation of water management is river basin oriented since the 1964 Act that 
establishes the agences financières de bassin (current water agencies) and the comités de 
bassin (watershed committees). Hydrographical districts in France mostly correspond to the 
boundaries of existing water agencies. Small adjustments occurred to distinguish between the 
Meuse and the Rhine basin, to separate coastal rivers on the Channel from the Scheldt 
catchment.  
 
Although not explicitly mentioned in the environmental code, the competent authority 
reporting WFD implementation to the European Commission is the river basin (district) 
coordinator (préfet coordonnateur de bassin) supported by State employees of the délégation 
de bassin and employees of the water agency. For international districts, international 
commissions take the lead. For instance, in the Rhône-Méditerranée basin, the délégation de 
bassin is located in Lyon. 
 
The Ministry of Environment initiated the designation of water bodies supported by Cemagref 
expertise on hydro-ecoregions. Then water agencies made some adjustments. Maps and 
reports are designed at the basin level.  
 
The characterization of water bodies (state and pressures) and the design of the programme of 
measures have generally been made by experts in agences de l’eau based on central expertise 
and models.  
 
When they exist, SAGE designed at local level and approved by the préfet de department (art. 
L212-3 CE), should comply with SDAGE. They should set up rules in order to meet WFD 
objectives but the majority of non-State members of the CLE are not accountable for the 
WFD implementation. Only the State is. It is not clear yet what means the State may use to 
enforce the WFD. Possibly limitations of cross-funding may become a tangible threat in the 
coming years.  
Public involvement in implementing the WFD 
In most water districts (basins) the public was asked to answer a questionnaire sent to all 
inhabitants and focused on the main orientations given to the SDAGE. For instance, in the 
Rhône-Méditerrannée district, the process of consultation was the following. 
 
Date Public event Content 
2003 
 
Geographical commissions of the basin 
committee 
information on natural waterbodies, WFD methodology 
through examples 
 
Basin Committee validating the WFD organization for the characterization, 
designating natural waterbodies, information on protected 
areas 
 
On-line information maps on water quality and pressures, evolution scenarios 
 
Technical meetings at regional level sub-basin working groups on pressures, risk for not 
achieving the good status, confronting local experts 
judgements and basin data 
 
Basin Committee validating the table of contents for characterization, 
discussing data on protected areas 
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Sectorial working groups collecting contributions for the evolution of activities by 
2015 and for 'important questions" 
 




Basin Committee examining first draft of characterization, and cost-recovery 
report 
 On-line information Register of protected areas 
 Consulting local governments first draft of characterization 
 On-line information first draft of characterization 
 
Geographical commissions of the basin 
committee 
appendix to characterization (maps, list of waterbodies, local 
expertise) 
 
On-line information appendix to characterization (maps, list of waterbodies, local 
expertise) 
2005 Basin Committee Official approval of the characterization report 
 
Mailing characterization report sent by ordinary mail to individuals 
on simple request 
 
Reporting The State reported to the EC the synthesis of all 
characterization documents 
 Public consultation questionnaire sent to all inhabitants 
 
Technical meetings at regional level method and definition of the programme of measures 
2006 State notice  on fundamental orientations 
 
Geographical commissions of the basin 
committee 
draft for fundamental orientations 
 state decision approving basin data and maps 
 state decision monitoring program 
2007 Basin Committee discussing SDAGE first draft 
 
Geographical commissions of the basin 
committee 
discussing SDAGE first draft 
 
Basin Committee discussing SDAGE second draft and Program of Measures 
2008 Nationwide public consultation basin-oriented questionnaire on fundamental orientations 
2009 
Consulting local governments SDAGE draft 
4. Conclusion 
Main features of water governance in France might be summarised as follows: 
- the changing role of the French State which, while remaining a major stakeholder in the 
field of water, is no longer alone in making public action and decision. The progressive 
involvement of the European Union in the water policy combined with the French 
decentralisation laws are responsible for transferring part of the central State’s power 
towards both the local and the European levels.  
- the challenge of implementing the WFD involving, in terms of governance, (i) a partial 
recentralisation with the creation of ONEMA; (ii) an increasing need for environment 
voices and a redefinition of the experts’s contribution in making public action, and (iii) a 
growing awareness and involvement of the public in defining public action for water. 
- the evolution of water governance institutional framework allows to: (i) transfer 
competencies towards territorial authorities and making emerge intercommunalité in 
water governance process; (ii) create new places of public action that are competent for 
making their own local rules (according to the national and water district regulations). 
This is particularly true for the Agences de l’eau and the CLE; and (iii) strengthen the role 
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of the maîtres d’ouvrages (such as EPTB) in implementing the decisions of the CLE. The 
rise of these structures in the construction of local public action for water should better 
reflect the issues of territorial solidarity for water management. 
- the development of concerted water management in formal and informal local places, as a 
characteristic of the French governance. 
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